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Abstract 
There are needs for ship registers to become business oriented but maintain the 
quality of fleet.  To meet these two objectives, Hong Kong Shipping Register 
(HKSR) was re-engineered in 1999.  An autonomous HKSR was established 
before the handover of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 1997. When 
the newly established HKSR began operation, it fell to merely 5.5 million tons 
in late 1997. In May 2009, the registered tonnage was 41 million tons and the 
HKSR achieved significant growth of 7.5 times of that in 1997. The study through 
interviews analyses the paradigm shifts in the shipping registry policy in Hong 
Kong which led to a successful revitalization of the registered tonnage. External 
factors of the shipping community and internal factors of the administration in 
Hong Kong became major drives of the revitalization of the HKSR. The paradigm 
shifts include a new page of dialogue in formulation of policy of shipping registry 
with the stakeholders, structural change of quality and survey mechanism in 
HKSR, restructure of the consultative platforms in connection to enhancement of 
customer satisfaction, involvement of diplomatic assistance from Beijing and in-
depth re-engineering of the bureaucratic system in the shipping registry in Hong 
Kong.
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I. Introduction 
Most newly industrialized countries or places, such as South Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong Kong put a high priority on shipping development 
as an essential element towards their trade and economic development and their 
foreign trade has grown more rapidly than that of the developed countries(Frankel 
1989). Shipping development is one of the important factors of the trade and 
economic development in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Shipping Register 
(HKSR) was established for more than 140 years but Hong Kong registered ships 
had to be registered under the British Shipping Register prior to 1997. Before 
the handover of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 1997, an autonomous 
HKSR was established in 1990 and a new set of law for the HKSR is required. In 
May 2009, the statistics show that the Hong Kong registered tonnage dramatically 
reached 41 million tons and the HKSR achieved a significant growth of 7.5 times 
between 1997 and 2009. No study was conducted to analyse the causes of the 
significant growth of registered tonnage in the HKSR and paradigm shifts, if any, 
in the process of its revitalization. The objectives of the study are to identify the 
paradigm shifts in the formation and growth of the autonomous HKSR; and to 
investigate the success factors of its revitalization.
II. Methodology
A study which adopts qualitative analysis can be carried out in a rigorous and 
structured manner (Woodburn, 2007). It is suitable for some areas of maritime 
research to choose qualitative methodology as one of their alternatives in 
research, e.g., port policy, shipping policy, shipping taxation policy or seafaring 
experiences (Vining and Boardman, 2008; Qiu, 2008; McLellan, 2006; Marlow 
and Mitroussi, 2008; Mack 2007; Everett, 2007). A qualitative approach is used in 
the examination of the cause of delays in expanding coal export infrastructure and 
the number of regulatory regimes directly impacting on the facility and operation 
(Everett, 2007). 
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The study uses qualitative methodology with the assistance of interviews. The 
study builds upon a review of public information such as official statistics and 
policy statements of Marine Department, Maritime Industry Council, Hong Kong 
Government, Department of Justice, International Maritime Organisation and US 
Coast Guard. It has been supplemented by analysis of the process of formation 
and development of the HKSR using original data collected from the public and 
private sector. The analysis provides insight into the changes of the HKSR. The 
study adopts qualitative in-depth interviews with 11 senior and middle managers 
in the public and private sector of the shipping industry in Hong Kong. The 
study finds and analyses the evidence of paradigm shift and success factors in the 
formation, growth and revitalization of the HKSR.
The paper, which analyzes policy response of intra-European short sea shipping, 
UK coastal shipping, urban/river transport and global container shipping, 
employs a qualitative approach (Barid, 2005). Maritime researchers appear 
to be discovering that seafaring experiences, particularly the human element, 
are difficult to explore and represent with statistics and tables, and therefore 
qualitative methods are needed (Mack, 2007).
The study uses qualitative methodology with the assistance of interviews. The 
study builds upon a review of public information such as official statistics and 
policy statements of the Marine Department, HKSAR, Maritime Industry Council, 
Hong Kong Government, Department of Justice, HKSAR, International Maritime 
Organization and US Coast Guard. It has been supplemented by analysis of the 
process of formation and development of the HKSR using original data collected 
from the public and private sector. The analysis provides insight into the changes 
of the HKSR. The study adopts qualitative in-depth interviews with eleven senior 
and middle managers in the public and private sector of the shipping industry in 
Hong Kong.
In a study of a case company, 19 in-depth interviews in a service company 
were included (Olsson and Karlsson, 2003). Four interviewees were selected for 
a study which was complemented by other information from industry journals 
and company archives (Penaloza, Brooks, Marche, 2007). In other examples: one 
company was used to illustrate how the e-business planning model was applied 
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in a practical context (Tang, Burridge and Ang, 2003); and only one automotive 
component supplier, Trico, and its strategic supply base were involved in another 
study (Esain, 2000). The study examines the source of law on the HKSR due 
to the handover of the sovereignty from Britain to China. It further finds and 
analyzes the evidence of paradigm shift and success factors in the formation, 
growth and revitalization of the HKSR. 
The source of law in changing ship registration and related legislations after the 
handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 is the Sino-British Joint Declaration on 
the Question of Hong Kong (HKSAR Government, 2009) and the Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Chinese Government, 1990). 
After years of negotiation between China and the U.K., the Joint Declaration 
was signed in 1984. It sets out, among other things, the basic policies of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) regarding Hong Kong. Under the principle of 
‘one country, two systems’, the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Hong Kong’s 
previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years. The 
Joint Declaration provides that these basic policies will be stipulated in the Basic 
Law of the HKSAR.
 
III.  Paradigm Shifts started in the Revamping 
of the Law of Shipping Registry
Traditionally shipowners chose a ship register for the convenience of shipping 
operations, e.g. with minimal interference from flag state.  However, with more 
stringent requirements of quality shipping (e.g. ISM Code, ISPS Code, STCW), 
shipowners now realize the importance of quality registers.  Apart from the role of 
regulator, ship registers are expected to assist shipowners’ shipping operations in 
various aspects .
The Hong Kong Government had the legislative power to revamp the law of 
ship registration based on the Joint Declaration and it was definitely too late to 
plan for revamping until the Basic Law was put into effect on July 1, 1997. 
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Foreign and local shipowners in Hong Kong wanted to know how the laws of 
ship registration would be changed well in advance of the handover so that they 
had sufficient time to plan to stay or not.  Insofar as to the previous systems of 
shipping management and regulation of Hong Kong, the Joint Declaration states 
that the Hong Kong maintains its previous systems of shipping management and 
shipping regulation, including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. 
The specific functions and responsibilities of the Hong Kong Government in 
the field of shipping are defined by the Hong Kong Government on its own. 
Private shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container 
terminals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely (Sino-British Joint 
Declaration 1984). It is vital for Hong Kong to change the law of ship registration 
well before 1997 in order to lay down the foundation of the shipping register in 
Hong Kong.
The revision of the shipping law in Hong Kong in 1997 is an overhaul due to 
political reasons and there is no other option. The revision of the shipping register 
in Hong Kong becomes a natural process of change under the blanket cover of 
the major overhaul of all legislations prior to the handover. Revising the law of 
shipping register is the first paradigm shift. The HKSR had been established and 
running for 150 years in 1997. Hong Kong, which was a British colony until 
1997, wished to have a smooth transition of the shipping register on the return of 
sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997. Prior to 1997, a ship had to be registered 
on the British Shipping Register in the name of Port of Hong Kong if a Hong 
Kong shipowner wanted to register his ship in Hong Kong. Despite the different 
attempts to formulate and establish an autonomous shipping register in Hong 
Kong, the British Government did not support the idea. It means the HKSR before 
1997 had to follow exactly with the British Shipping Register. The system of the 
British Shipping Register was rather rigid and inflexible due to its long maritime 
tradition and the transitional period to 1997 provided an excellent opportunity for 
change.
The name ‘Hong Kong Shipping Register’ was used when it was under the 
British regime until 1990. The name was retained when it became the ‘autonomous 
HKSR’ under the Chinese regime after 1990. Before the autonomous Hong Kong 
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Shipping Registry was planned and established, a Steering Committee chaired by 
the then Economic Services Branch of the Government of Hong Kong, including 
people from the local shipping industry and Marine Department was set up. The 
tasks of the Steering Committee were never easy as all the shipping rules and 
regulations in relation to the shipping register and other shipping issues had to be 
examined and amended to international standard. The HKSR inherited the good 
and bad practices of the British Shipping Registry. It was found that the principal 
hindrance to shipowners were the traditional requirements on manning of British 
nationality, in particular employment of British senior officers, use of British-
made equipment, and antiquated legal procedures regarding registration, ship 
surveys and ship mortgages. The new shipping law, covering registration of ships, 
surveys, quality control, safety, charges, etc., was enacted on December 3, 1990. 
The Hong Kong Government with the shipping community in Hong Kong tried 
their best in formulating an updated shipping register but nobody knew in advance 
whether the newly created HKSR continued to attract shipowners registering 
their tonnage in Hong Kong. The work of revising the details of the shipping 
regulations of Hong Kong and inserting new sections here and there continued 
thereafter. The job of localising the British shipping law in Hong Kong was more 
or less complete by 1997-1998. It seemed that the issues of the shipping register 
were resolved early on and the Hong Kong Government waited for the handover 
in 1997. Unfortunately it was not the case and serious problems occurred 
threatening the survival of the HKSR well before 1997.
IV. Crisis of the HKSR approaching the handover
The gross tonnage under the Hong Kong flag was 6.3 million tons in 1990 (see 
Table 1: Registered Gross Tonnage from December 1990 to February 2009 in 
the HKSR), when the newly established HKSR began operation. It did not rise 
above 10 million tons during the entire period from 1990 to 1997 though there 
was an incentive of capping the registration fee and tonnage charge for large ships 
(Richardson 1992). But the worst time was around November 1997 in which 
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the gross tonnage fell to merely 5.5 million tons. The Policy Bureau of the Hong 
Kong Government was seriously concerned, and tried to find the causes of the 
fall. The reasons for the rapid decline in the registered tonnage were multiple and 
complex. Possible causes included the lack of political confidence in China, the 
HKSR and the worry about a lack of quality control in the shipping register after 
Hong Kong’s return to China. The withdrawal of tonnage from P&O alone cut the 
tonnage in the HKSR by 1.2 million tons before 1997. 
Before successfully resolving the worries of the Hong Kong shipping industry, 
a serious internal problem arose in Marine Department. The issue related to the 
survey staffs in Marine Department who were extremely concerned about the loss 
of authority in conducting surveys of ships while they were being used to carry 
out audit inspections of all ships registered in Hong Kong. Surveyors of Marine 
Department opined that they had more authority if they played the role of surveyor 
instead of ‘auditor’. They felt that the quality of the Hong Kong registered ship 
might be under threat if the survey work was delegated to third parties like 
Classification Societies while surveyors of Marine Department only performed 
the audit function. The survey staffs of Marine Department also worried that they 
might have no role to play in relation to the HKSR and this would later lead to 
substantial loss of jobs. What they had observed was the significant decline of the 
tonnage registered in Hong Kong and it seemed to them that the new HKSR had 
not turned the tide around in attracting more domestic and foreign tonnage joining 
it. The senior management of Marine Department found that it was not straight 
forward to convince the survey staffs of the merits of the new system of audit 
inspection. Marine Department did not give up the newly established autonomous 
HKSR and thought of re-engineering the structure of the HKSR.
V. Re-engineering of the HKSR in 1998
The autonomous HKSR commenced to operate on December 3, 1990. The 
abrupt and continual decline of the registered tonnage in Hong Kong to a record 
low of 5.5 million tons posed a real threat to the entire establishment of the 
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HKSR in 1997. To counter this, Marine Department decided to carry out an in-
depth re-engineering exercise in 1998. Many possible issues could be included 
in the re-engineering exercise, e.g. growth of tonnage, amount of revenue, 
quality of tonnage, incentives to attract more tonnage or size of the HKSR in 
the world league, but it was not easy to determine which ones should be the top 
priorities for the future of the HKSR. In a study based upon Lloyd’s of London 
casualty records, a risk factor that had significant and independent effect upon the 
likelihood of a bulk carrier foundering was related to the ship’s flag of registration 
(Roberts and Marlow, 2002). One of the requirements of the re-engineering is 
that Hong Kong did not want to see its ‘newly’ established shipping registry to 
be associated with any statistics of major casualties. The evidence presented 
against flags of convenience in terms of vessel safety appears overwhelmingly 
deleterious. The International Transport Workers’ Federation indicates in their 
‘Flag of Convenience Campaign Report’ for 1998 that of the worst 20 flags both 
in terms of absolute numbers of vessels and absolute tonnage lost in 1998, ten 
are flags of convenience (Alderton and Winchester, 2002). On the other hand it is 
important to distinguish between the shipping registries which offer the necessary 
guarantees in terms of quality and safety and those which do not. It is a mistake 
to label closed registers intrinsically safe and abiding by international regulations, 
and flags of convenience as unsafe and dangerous (Llacer, 2003). Hong Kong 
did not want to be in the group of 20 flags above purely because of the pressure 
of growth in tonnage and whatever tonnage was offered. It meant that the quality 
of the tonnage registered could not be compromised due to the growth of the 
registered tonnage in the HKSR. Having said that, Marine Department was not 
sure that the registered tonnage would grow if more incentives were provided for 
domestic and international shipowners.
Study finds that more incentives in the shipping policy on national shipping did 
not progressively increase the tonnage of the shipping registry in Taiwan and de-
regulation of the maritime transport market basically had no impact to shipping 
carriers (Chiu, 2007). It seems that providing incentives is not a guarantee of more 
tonnage in the HKSR in long term. One of the strategies, which Hong Kong can 
consider, is to attract tonnage which adopts either the Greek shipping policy or 
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management-intensive shipping policy described by Goss. The strategy assists to 
recruit long term quality shipowners and/or ship operators into the HKSR (Goss, 
2008). Marine Department decided to maintain quality of the fleet in the HKSR 
regardless the growth of the HKSR increased or decreased.
The senior management of Marine Department took a different approach in this 
important project. A paradigm shift in formulating a new policy in the HKSR 
was attempted. The concept of a brand new idea, namely Flag State Quality 
Control (FSQC), was considered. The senior management of Marine Department 
this time involved the middle management and front line staffs at the beginning 
of the re-engineering exercise and they owned the problem and also proposed 
alternatives to the problems. The responsibility for action was delegated to the 
survey staff of Marine Department. They were asked to identify possible issues 
in connection to the survey of ships and look for appropriate solutions. It was not 
a straight forward problem because the team had to strike a fine balance between 
maintaining the quality of ships registered with the HKSR up to international 
standards and at the same time reducing the costs of surveys for shipowners who 
compete for business worldwide. Shipping community is alarmed if a shipping 
registry reaches a situation of the Panamanian Shipping Registry which at one 
stage kept a high casualty rate, worsened by the absence of procedures for the 
investigation of casualties, and the alarming situation related to Port State Control 
(Llacer, 2004). The team finally solved the issues of the survey of the registered 
tonnage in Hong Kong by outsourcing surveys to the Classification Societies, 
which had a much wider worldwide network as well as expertise. The survey staff 
of Marine Department remained responsible for the monitoring of the quality of 
the registered ships on the HKSR. A study reveals that the shipping industry is 
a relatively safe industry but there is a possible over-inspection of vessels. The 
effect of inspections varies across ship types and the prevention of incidents with 
high economic costs can be improved by a coordinated approach of all types 
of inspections that are performed which allows the decrease of unnecessary 
inspections. More emphasis should be placed by a shipping registry on the 
rectification and follow-up of deficiencies and the implementation of the ISM 
code (Bijwaard and Knapp, 2009). Hong Kong took the issue of over-inspection 
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into consideration when it formulated the mechanism of the FSQC Programme.
The basic principle behind the FSQC is that the Register takes up an overall 
monitoring role on all the aspects and stakeholders affecting the quality of Hong 
Kong registered ships.  The original scope of ship registry focuses on the flag 
State inspection only, without much association to the performance of related 
organizations, e.g. management companies .
The concept of the FSQC Programme was first formulated among shipping 
registers worldwide by Marine Department which later creatively devised another 
concept, namely the Pre-registration Quality Control Programme (PRQC), which 
targets second hand ships wanting to join the HKSR. Marine Department was 
determined to uphold and maintain a high level of quality in the HKSR including 
the FSQC Programme (MD, 2008). It has implemented the FSQC system since 
1999 to monitor and upkeep the quality of Hong Kong registered cargo ships. It 
aims to discharge the obligations under the international maritime conventions 
vested to a signatory state. The FSQC system consists of quality assessment, 
quality assurance inspections, and monitoring the performance of Recognised 
Organisations. The PRQC serves as a gatekeeper against a substandard ship 
which applies for registration to the HKSR. It was introduced in 2004 to ensure 
ships joining the HKSR are complying with all applicable safety and pollution 
prevention standards of the relevant international conventions at the time of 
entry. On receiving notice that a ship has applied to join the Register, Marine 
Department assesses the condition of the vessel taking into account the ship age, 
ship type, number of Port State Control detentions, number of Port State Control 
deficiencies, existing flag, existing classification society and accident records of 
the ship, etc. to determine if the ship warrants a PRQC inspection. All critical 
deficiencies detected during the inspection must be rectified before the Certificate 
of Registration can be issued. If the condition of a ship is found unacceptable, 
registration will be refused (MD). The two programmes contributed a great deal 
towards directly revitalizing the HKSR without sacrificing quality and safety. 
Relying on quality of the fleet in the HKSR cannot be the only success factor 
of the HKSR and Marine Department started to further the relationship with the 
private sector.
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VI. Partnership between the government and private sector
Marine Department was often caught between the provision of quality service 
and the shipping industry which wanted to lower the charges in relation to the 
shipping register. It was found that it was vital to keep continual dialogue going 
between Marine Department, shipowners, the relevant staff at the working level of 
the shipping companies and other stakeholders of the shipping industry in Hong 
Kong. The methodology of collecting feedback and opinions used by Marine 
Department included regular interviews and questionnaire surveys. 
Initiatives which are successful are originally started by Marine Department 
which is prepared to involve a certain amount of trial and error. An initiative 
might originally be worked out by the senior management of Marine Department 
and then promoted in various events for the stakeholders of the shipping industry. 
Staffs of Marine Department have to make ample time to receive input from the 
shipping industry in Hong Kong for improvement and amendments. 
In 1997, Hong Kong Shipowners Association submitted a formal proposal to 
the Hong Kong Government on the question of fees of the HKSR. The Economic 
Services Bureau, HKSAR, and Marine Department reviewed the proposal in 
relation to the level of fees, the ship surveying procedure and other related areas. 
Other relevant units in the Hong Kong Government were involved in order to 
expedite the process of revision and enhancement of the HKSR. The Finance 
Bureau which was responsible for setting Government fees and charges was 
also involved. The objective was to streamline the fee structure, to reduce the 
cost burden to shipowners and to increase the competitiveness and attraction of 
our shipping register (Ip, 1997). Other departments joined in to make way for 
changes. The Services Advisory Committee of the Trade Development Council 
and the Hong Kong Shipowners Association worked together promoting Hong 
Kong as a ship management centre on different occasions. After strengthening the 
cooperation with the private sector and different government departments in Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong also encountered problems in diplomatic arena.
The issue of a Hong Kong registered ship trading between Hong Kong and 
Taiwan after 1997 demonstrates a good example of constructive synergy between 
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the government and private sector in the shipping industry. The unification of 
Taiwan with the PRC is a sensitive political issue in China and Taiwan. The 
four pacts signed between China and Taiwan on November 4, 2008 signified 
the normalisation of cross-strait contacts by restoring the ‘three links’ - postal, 
transport and trade - cut nearly six decades ago between China and Taiwan (Ho, 
2008). Prior to 1997, a ship of the HKSR which flied the British flag encountered 
no difficulty politically in calling at the ports of Taiwan or a ship flying the flag 
of Taiwan calling at the port of Hong Kong. After the handover in 1997, a ship 
of the HKSR which flied the Chinese flag and HKSAR flag were not permitted 
to enter any port of Taiwan and nobody at that time could be sure when the three 
links were connected. It was a devastating impact to ships of the HKSR which 
could not continue to participate in the Hong Kong - Taiwan trade, which is 
worth more than 150 billion Hong Kong dollars a year. Contact through official 
channels between China and Taiwan was not frequent and it might take a long 
time if official talk was engaged. Mainland China appeared unwilling to start 
any official exchange in the government-to-government mode based on its ‘one 
China’ principle. It also refused negotiation through Strait Exchange Foundation 
(SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) mode 
before Taiwan had acknowledged the ‘1992 common understanding’ based on the 
interpretation of the Mainland China. At first, Taiwan was unwilling to contact 
the mainland Chinese authorities by official forms. The SEF, which was a private 
foundation, was established by Taiwan government in March 1991 as a window 
for interacting with the Mainland China. Mainland China also set up the ARATS 
in December 1991 in order to conduct negotiations and dialogue with Taiwan. In 
addition, the WTO mode was unworkable because mainland China had refused 
to discuss with Taiwan any issue in an international forum (Chang, Lin and Bao, 
2006). The problem was not encountered before by the governments of the three 
places, i.e., China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Only a shift from the old paradigm 
might break the deadlock. The shipping community in Hong Kong proactively 
played an important role as a bridge between China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Finally the governments of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong all agreed that the 
Hong Kong Shipowners Association could act as a non-government organisation 
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in talking to Taiwan about the issue of calling at Taiwanese ports by Hong Kong 
registered ships and vice versa.  Finally an agreement was reached ensuring the 
shipping links continued between Hong Kong and Taiwan after the transition in 
1997. The agreement guarantees that Hong Kong registered ships can continue 
to call at Taiwanese ports freely and vice versa, and it ensures that Hong Kong 
registered ships can continue to participate in the Hong Kong - Taiwan trade (Ip, 
1997).
The organisational enhancement of Marine Department together with the 
improvement of the HKSR was positively received by the shipping community 
in Hong Kong. Shipowners in Hong Kong voted with their feet demonstrating the 
competitiveness of the HKSR. The positive impact on the shipping community 
in respect of the HKSR was the improved competitiveness of the shipping 
industry in Hong Kong. The competitiveness was improved due to the facts that 
there were appropriate tonnage charges and fees; efficient services from Marine 
Department; responsible administration and regular dialogue among stakeholders 
. The result was increased business in Hong Kong from shipping companies based 
in China, Japan and Korea. The negative impact was not at first immediately 
obvious; the fast growing tonnage of the HKSR attracted more attention from 
some international labour unions such as the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation. Quality of the HKSR is frequently a concern for existing as well as 
potential shipowners.
VII. Quality of the HKSR
The term ‘flag of convenience’ emerged in the practice of international shipping 
during the mid-1940s, when several countries, principally Panama, Liberia and 
Honduras, began to grant their flag to any foreign merchant ship for a specified 
payment, confining themselves merely to registering it (Egiyan, 1990). Open 
registry is different from a flag of convenience. For almost four decades, the 
expansion of open registries’ shipping and the growing interest of several 
countries to increase the tonnage registered under their flags have allowed for 
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the creation of new maritime nations. These registries, which are also known as 
commercial registries, have allowed easy registration access and transfer of ships 
owned and controlled by non-citizens, low taxation, manning rules that are free of 
nationality requirements and other facilitations conducing to lower management 
costs. These characteristics contrast with the traditional registries’ requirements of 
ships to be owned, and/or managed, and to a certain extent manned by nationals 
of the flag-state (Corres and Pallis, 2008). Hong Kong does not want the HKSR to 
be classified as a flag of convenience. 
The Flag State Audit 2003 (Winchester and Alderton, 2003) develops a method 
of measuring the regulatory capacity of flag states. In overall terms, flag states 
are grouped into four bands, from ‘high’ to ‘poor’, according to the extent and 
effectiveness of their regulatory regimes. The HKSR was ranked by the audit as 
‘good’ in 2003. In the Audit, it was found that current flag state practice enabled 
vessels registered the freedom to define a regulatory environment in any way they 
see fit. A study by Corres and Pallis (2008) extends the assessment allowing for an 
in-depth empirical assessment of flags performance. In the ‘Excellent’ flag-state 
category of the global flag state performance of commercial flags, Hong Kong 
is one of the three shipping registers together with Bermuda and Liberia that are 
graded excellent (Corres and Pallis 2008, Table 6). As to the port state control 
performance of commercial flags, Hong Kong is top of the ‘Excellent’ flag-state 
category together with the Isle of Man, Liberia and Marshall Islands (Corres and 
Pallis 2008, Table 11)..
It is not easy to keep the average age of a shipping register down when the 
total tonnage is progressively increasing. The average ship’s age of the HKSR 
is 16.90 years when it had its record low in 1997. Fortunately the average ship’s 
age became younger, i.e., 15.64 years when the tonnage of the HKSR revised the 
falling trend and began to grow in 1998. The HKSR is successful in recruiting 
younger tonnage into the Register and the average ship’s age is more or less 
steady in a range of 11.2 years to 11.6 years in 2005 to 2008 (see Table 2). In 
October 2008, the oldest in age, i.e., 12.64 years is the category of general cargo 
ship; the bulk carrier is in second place at an average age of 11.47 years; container 
ship is in third place at an average age of 10.06 years; and tanker is in the last 
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place at an average age of 8.22 years. A fleet of younger age does not necessarily 
maintain a relatively good performance in quality management and detention 
rate of port state control reflects better the quality of performance in a shipping 
register.
The detention rate of a shipping register over a relatively long period of time 
is a valuable performance indicator in the quality of ship management in the 
shipping register. The detention rate of the HKSR is lower than the average 
detention rate under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU) 
between 1997 and 2007. The smallest gap occurred in 2004 where the HKSR 
is in the midst of continued growth in tonnage. The detention rate of the HKSR 
improves in 2006 and 2007 and it maintains a gap below the average detention 
rate of the Paris MOU (see Table 3). The difference of the detention rate of the 
HKSR is even greater from the average detention rate of the Tokyo Memorandum 
of Understanding (Tokyo MOU) from 1997 to 2007. It is a clear indication that 
the quality of the HKSR is relatively good. Regular inspections of Hong Kong 
registered ships are carried out. About 10% of the total Hong Kong registered 
tonnage was inspected under the Programme of FSQC in 1999. The rate of 
inspection came down to half at around 5% in 2003/04 because quality ships in 
the HKSR could be identified through the deployment of the list of deficiency 
under the Tokyo MOU and Paris MOU. In order to provide incentive for 
shipowners who have better quality tonnage, a scheme of reducing annual tonnage 
charge is established. With an aim to encourage a long term and stable registration 
under the HKSR and to promote the HKSR as a quality shipping register, an 
annual tonnage charge reduction scheme for Hong Kong registered ships was 
effective as of February 1, 2006. Under the scheme, for every two years that a 
ship is continuously registered with the HKSR and provided that the ship has 
no detention record under any port State control regime during such period, the 
registered owner of the ship is able to enjoy a six-month annual tonnage charge 
reduction for the following year (MD, 2008, Section 1.12).
When compared with the FOC, national flags usually give an impression as 
bureaucratic but not user-friendly.  However, user-friendliness does not necessarily 
conflict with proper control on ship quality.  The Hong Kong experience 
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demonstrates that the user-friendliness can be achieved without compromising 
proper and effective controls on ships. There are critical success factors which 
brought the HKSR forward.
VIII. Critical Success Factors of the HKSR
One of the success factors of the ‘new’ HKSR is the determination of Marine 
Department to revamp the ‘old’ HKSR. The challenge was to change the whole 
system of the tonnage charge so that it was in accordance with international 
practice, whereby an entry fee was charged according to the gross tonnage of 
a ship when she entered and an annual fee levied thereafter. But in the U.K. 
Shipping Register, a tonnage charge was only levied at registration of the vessel. 
There was no annual tonnage charge under the British registration system. The 
change in the tonnage charge coupled with the fee for a survey of the ship would 
have serious effects on the propensity of shipowners to fly the Hong Kong flag.
Survey fee was another hurdle in the HKSR which Marine Department had to 
overcome in order to attract domestic and foreign tonnage joining the HKSR. 
The survey fee was about US$26,000 to US$39,000 for an average sized ship 
when the ship joined the HKSR. Shipowners were negative about the high survey 
fee together with the annual tonnage fee and informed Marine Department that 
they were prepared to leave the HKSR when it commenced operation. Marine 
Department had little room to maneuver because the law which incorporated the 
regulations of the survey fee and the annual tonnage fee had been drafted and 
were ready for approval and enactment .
Marine Department did not extensively involve other important stakeholders of 
the HKSR, e.g., shipowners. But it realised that the issues were vital to the success 
of the HKSR and swiftly reacted to the serious concerns of the shipping industry 
on the survey fee and annual tonnage charge by adjusting its strategy and looking 
for a possible solution from the shipping industry before launching the HKSR on 
December 3, 1990. One of the issues directly related to the procedure of legislation 
in Hong Kong. According to traditional practice in the Hong Kong Government, 
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the stakeholders of the shipping industry had only been informed about the 
charges under the new fees structure; they had seldom been consulted during the 
drafting of the fees regulations. In this case the ultimatum from the local shipping 
industry was that the costs had to match those of international benchmarks if 
their tonnage was to continue to stay with the HKSR. It was extremely difficult 
for the Government to make any changes to the legislation of registration at this 
late stage just before the launching of the Shipping Register in December 1990. 
A paradigm shift was imminent and an innovative idea was urgently needed to 
break the standstill between the Government and the shipping industry. Marine 
Department came up with a ‘new’ service, namely the audit inspection, which 
would only cost shipowners around US$6,400 for an average ship instead of the 
US$26,000 to US$39,000 survey fee of entry. In the audit inspection, survey work 
on the registered ships was delegated to Classification Societies and the surveyors 
of Marine Department became auditor. The introduction of the audit inspection 
for entry to the shipping register could cope with the requirements for registration 
while taking note of the concerns of the shipping industry.
Another success factor of the HKSR directly connected to the paradigm shift in 
taxation which is an issue of concern to Hong Kong shipowners. Apart from the 
registration charge and annual tonnage charge on a Hong Kong registered ship, 
she is subject to profit tax or tonnage tax. Income derived from the operation of 
ships within Hong Kong or from voyages commencing from Hong Kong waters is 
generally chargeable to tax under the Inland Revenue Ordinance. Double taxation 
arises when two or more tax jurisdictions overlap with each other in levying the 
tax charge, as a consequence the same item of income or profit may be subject 
to tax in each jurisdiction (MD, 2008, Section 1.16). It was difficult to justify a 
proposal of reducing taxation for the shipping industry while there was no positive 
sign that the revenue of the Hong Kong Government might increase due to more 
tonnage registering in the HKSR. The Hong Kong Shipowners Association put 
forward a submission to the Hong Kong Government concerning the freight tax 
imposed by some overseas countries which puts Hong Kong registered ships in 
a disadvantageous position. Hong Kong Government was convinced and finally 
agreed and the Finance Bureau examined the issue of taxation of shipping in the 
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context of the Government’s review of profits tax so as to create a level playing 
field for Hong Kong shipowners (Ip, 1997). A double taxation agreement may 
either be a comprehensive one covering various incomes including transport 
income or be limited to transport income only covering shipping income or 
both airline and shipping income. The Hong Kong Government negotiated with 
a number of its close trading partners, who did not have reciprocal exemption 
provisions in their domestic tax laws (MD, 2008, Section 1.16). The Central 
Government is supportive to the growth of the HKSR.
Beijing indirectly became a drive on the development of the HKSR. The Central 
Chinese Government’s 11th Five-Year Plan 2006-2010 (Chinese Government, 
2006) gave unequivocal support to the development of Hong Kong’s logistics 
industry and the maintaining of its position as an international maritime centre. 
In response, the government in Hong Kong set up a Focus Group on Maritime, 
Logistics and Infrastructure to consider and develop strategic proposals and 
policies which could be adopted to meet these objectives. In January 2007, 
the Focus Group issued a report (HKSAR Government, 2007), arguing that 
Hong Kong should make appropriate adjustments to its existing policies and 
measures, so as to provide an infrastructure conducive to the development of the 
logistics industry and improve its business environment in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of the whole industry. In respect of taxation, the Focus Group 
made two broad recommendations namely to introduce a tonnage tax system 
and increase the number of tax treaties that Hong Kong has concluded with other 
countries (KPMG, 2007). The Hong Kong Government actively negotiated and 
concluded avoidance of double taxation agreements with other trading partners 
HKSAR 2007. On February 11, 2009, the Hong Kong Government bilaterally 
signed Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with twelve countries (DoJ, 
2009).
The Focus Group on Maritime, Logistics and Infrastructure also proposed 
to consider making reference to overseas practice to make tonnage tax as an 
alternative to the profits tax currently imposed on vessels. The Hong Kong 
Government needed to further assess the feasibility and implications of the 
proposal and to consult the industry on the impacts of Tonnage Tax on the 
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policy to attract shipowners to register in Hong Kong and the current tax system 
(HKSAR Government, 2007). Tonnage tax is a special tax regime that many 
countries have introduced to provide a more straightforward and preferential 
calculation of the taxable profits of shipping companies. Broadly, under a tonnage 
tax regime, shipping companies will determine their income according to the 
net tonnage per qualifying ship multiplied by a fixed amount. Thereafter, the 
normal corporate tax rate will be applied on this income to arrive at the shipping 
company’s tax liability. The method of tonnage tax is simpler in that it does not 
require the exact assessable income and deductible expenses to be ascertained. 
Tonnage tax is not a separate type of tax, but is essentially an alternative way 
of computing tax liabilities for shipping companies. It is usually optional and 
shipping companies can elect whether or not to be subject to the tonnage tax 
regime. Countries like Denmark, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, the UK and the US have already adopted a similar approach in tonnage 
tax (KMPG, 2007). Chinese shipping companies look for international shipping 
register with high quality so that they can have another international platform to 
register their tonnage.
The flagging out of Chinese shipping companies in the Mainland to the HKSR 
is a critical impetus in the growth of the HKSR. Chinese flagging out started in 
the 1950s, in a relatively small scale, due to western embargo policies. Chinese 
trade was carried by joint venture companies set up with socialist partners such 
as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Albania, and later seized trading opportunities 
with countries China had not as yet established diplomatic relations. Flagging 
out took massive dimensions and momentum after the open-door policy in 1978 
under the consequences of taxation, profitability and operational considerations 
(Haralambides and Yang, 2003).
One major factor for the success was a shift in paradigm in the culture of 
customer service within Marine Department. A project of re-engineering for 
improving customer service in a government department could be conducted 
from time to time while shifting its paradigm in the culture of customer service 
is completely another issue. There is an apparent change in the attitude towards 
customer service in Marine Department. After careful consideration, a one-
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stop-shop approach in the registry of shipping was adopted and implemented in 
Marine Department as previously there had been more than one section of Marine 
Department which was involved in registering a ship in Hong Kong. A one-stop-
shop service allows shipowners to process ship registration, applications for 
manning certificates and seafarers’ licenses, survey arrangements and radio station 
licenses at one location in Marine Department. Another major change is that the 
staffs of the HKSR in Marine Department provided a service for shipowners 
outside office hours or during holidays, if requested (MD, 2007). An office in 
Marine Department could handle or assist with all the issues of registry of a ship 
after the implementation of the one-stop-shop approach. The change of working 
pattern in Marine Department is one of the success factors in the growth of the 
HKSR and a critical shift in paradigm in a government department.
Apart from the issues of quality, regulations, charges and communication, 
in recent years Marine Department has been successful in the simplification 
of procedures as well as the maintenance of the role of Marine Department 
in the control of the quality of registered ships under the HKSR . Among the 
stakeholders in the private shipping sector, Marine Department also relied on 
the consultative committees, which represent wide coverage in different sectors 
of the shipping industry in Hong Kong, for feedback and advice. Task Forces 
were formed under the Maritime Industry Council. The Hong Kong Shipowners 
Association also had various committees taking care of different issues in the 
shipping industry and the Hong Kong Shipowners Association invited from time 
to time the participation of Marine Department on specific issues of concern to the 
shipping industry. Marine Department continued to enhance the HKSR by taking 
a number of measures to make the HKSR more user-friendly. These included 
the introduction of bilingual certificates, the publication of a user handbook, and 
the use of the Internet to disseminate information. Hong Kong under the Basic 
Law does not have jurisdiction in foreign affairs and Beijing assists Hong Kong 
shipowners when their ships require diplomatic assistance outside Hong Kong 
and China.
Diplomatic assistance in emergency (MD, 2007) offered to shipowners is one of 
the important factors in choice of shipping register. The Hong Kong Government 
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obtained the support of the Central Government when diplomatic assistance is 
required overseas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to assist and issued an 
instruction for PRC embassies and consulate offices overseas to provide consular 
assistance for Hong Kong registered ships when required (Ip, 1997). International 
shipping faces many potential threats arising from both ‘normal’ crime and 
terrorism due to the fact that merchant shipping is highly vulnerable (King, 2005). 
The piracy attacks against merchant shipping off the coast of Somalia are under 
the spot light internationally. The London-based International Maritime Bureau 
said more than 100 vessels had been attacked in the coast of Somalia in 2008 and 
14 ships were held for ransom in January 2009, including Saudi supertanker ‘Sirius 
Star’ and the ‘Faina’, a Ukrainian cargo vessel carrying 32 military tanks. In 
response to the issue of safety of seafarers and cargoes on board Chinese merchant 
ships, a Chinese naval fleet arrived on January 6, 2009 in the waters of the Gulf 
of Aden off Somalia to carry out the first escort mission against pirates (People’s 
Daily, 2009a). Soon after its arrival, the fleet conducted its first escort service for 
four Chinese merchant vessels, including one from Hong Kong (People’s Daily, 
2009b). The Hong Kong Government does not have the capacity to provide the 
coverage in protecting its Hong Kong registered ship overseas.
IX. Conclusion
The gross tonnage under the Hong Kong flag was 6.3 million tons in 1990 when 
the newly established HKSR began operation and it fell to merely 5.5 million 
tons in November 1997. On May 2009, the registered tonnage was 41 million 
tons in the HKSR. The study through interviews analyses the paradigm shift in 
the shipping registry policy in Hong Kong which led to a successful revitalization 
of the registered tonnage. The paradigm shifts included the revision of the law 
of shipping register which required the approval and assistance of the Central 
Government in Beijing prior to the handover in 1997; the formulation of a new 
policy for the HKSR which involved the interests of different stakeholders; the 
new approach in reaching an agreement for Hong Kong registered ships which 
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call at Taiwanese ports which was a highly unpredictable task in the political 
arena between China and Taiwan; the breakage of the standstill between the 
Government and the shipping industry by coming up with audit inspection 
system; the changes in the policy of taxation for Hong Kong registered ships 
which was a sensitive issue relating to income of Hong Kong Government; and 
the significant change of attitude in the culture of customer service within Marine 
Department which is definitely one of the corner stones of the revitalization. 
Statistics demonstrated to the shipping industry and the Hong Kong Government 
that the quality of ships registered in the HKSR has not been compromised despite 
its continual growth in last decade.1)*
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<Table 1>  Registered Gross Tonnage from December 1990 to February 2009 in the HKSR
Source: Marine Department
<Table 2>  Average Ship Age of Ocean Going Vessels of the HKSR
Source: Marine Department
<Table 3>  Average Detention Rate and Detention Rate of 
       Hong Kong Registered Ships in Paris MOU & Tokyo MOU in 1997-2007
Source: Marine Department
Source: Marine Department
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